We show that public provision of private goods by local governments may be justi…ed on pure e¢ ciency grounds. A local government's involvement in the provision of the private good supplies it with information about individuals' private good purchases that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic e¢ ciency under a condition that is always ful…lled under stochastic independence and satis…ed for an open set of joint distributions. Our theory predicts that only private goods for which consumers cannot price arbitrage can be used by the government to improve e¢ ciency.
Introduction
Governments at all levels not only provide public goods, but also devote considerable resources to the provision of private goods such as health care, housing and education. This is puzzling in the light of the standard public …nance justi…cations for government intervention in the marketplace. Over the last twenty years a number of models have been developed to rationalize public provision of private goods; but almost all such models ultimately explain it as an instrument to redistribute from the wealthy to the poor. However, some publicly provided private goods have arguably either neutral or regressive distributional consequences, with the publicly-provided higher education being one of the prime examples.
This paper provides a novel explanation for public provision of private goods. We adapt familiar ideas from the literature on commodity bundling to a welfare optimization problem involving both public and private goods, and show that public provision of private goods can be explained as an instrument to improve economic e¢ ciency. Using publicly-provided higher education as a concrete example, our model implies that, in an e¢ cient allocation, the in-state tuition for college education (a private good) should be below the out-of-state tuition to provide incentives for the citizens (i.e. parents of current and/or future college students) to stay in the State and pay the taxes that …nance the local public goods.
We model the government as a benevolent social planner operating in an economy with both private and excludable public goods. A consumer's preference toward the public and private goods is her private information and unobserved by the planner. We also assume that there are no complementarities between the private and the public goods on either the production or the consumption side. As a benchmark, we consider the case where by assumption the public good and the private good are provided separately. That is, each good is allocated without use of individual data from the other market, thus ruling out mechanisms, for example, where the price charged for the private good depends on whether the individual is willing to pay the user fee for the public good. Cross subsidies, however, are allowed. Alternatively, one can think of the separation provision problem as one where two independent government agencies are separately in charge of the public and private good provisions, but where the government as a whole faces a single integrated budget constraint. Besides the restriction that information cannot be shared between the two agencies, we impose no other restrictions on the feasible mechanisms. However, using arguments from the optimal auction literature we provide a very simple characterization of the best separate provision mechanism, which can be described as an access fee for the public good, a provision probability of the public good, and a price for the private good. Thus the best separate provision mechanism is fully consistent with a decentralized market for the private good as all the agency in charge of the private good market needs to do is to set a constant sales tax for the private good.
We contrast the best separate provision mechanism with the case where the goods are jointly provided. By "joint provision," we mean that all information can be used for decisions on pricing and provision of both goods. This leads to a model where types are multidimensional, thus preventing us from characterizing the constrained optimal mechanism due to well-understood technical di¢ culties. Fortunately, our primary interest is the qualitative question of when public provision of the private good is welfare improving. For this, it is su¢ cient to demonstrate that there is some joint provision mechanism that outperforms the best separate provision mechanism. We thus consider small deviations from the best separate provision mechanism and furthermore restrict ourselves to deviations characterized by three …xed prices, one for the private good only, one for the public good only, and one for the bundle consisting of both goods. Under a condition, which is satis…ed by a large set of joint distributions, including the case where valuations are independent, there indeed exists deviation mechanisms within the restricted class that improve upon the best separate provision mechanism. The welfare improving mechanism we identify is generally not constrained optimal because we are making a local argument using only a particular class of pricing mechanisms, but the constrained optimal mechanism must weakly outperform the simple mechanism under our consideration. Hence the optimal joint provision mechanism must condition prices for private good consumption on valuations for the public good. This cannot be implemented using an anonymous market mechanism for the private good, which is why we interpret non-separability between the markets as public provision.
Our paper makes three main contributions to the literature on the public provision of private goods. 1 First, in our paper the driving force for the welfare improvement from the public provision of private goods is that it generates information that allows for more e¢ cient revenue extraction which can then be used to fund typically under-provided public good. In contrast, all existing explanations for the public provision of private goods rely upon preferences for redistribution. Since many publicly-provided private goods indeed have neutral or regressive distributional e¤ects, our e¢ ciency based explanation complements the redistribution based existing literature.
Second, in this paper we adopt a mechanism design approach, which forces us to establish the e¢ ciency property of the public provision of private goods by comparing the welfare under some joint provision mechanism with the best outcome that can be implemented under separate provisions. This is in stark contrast to most of the existing literature where the benchmark outcome is often derived under various implicit restrictions on the operation of the private good market.
Third, our paper not only explains that public provision of some private goods may improve e¢ ciency, but also highlights that only private goods for which consumers can not engage in price arbitrage could be used by the government to improve e¢ ciency. This natural boundary on the public provision of private goods is desirable from a theoretical viewpoint, and is in contrast with the existing redistribution-based literature where it is silent on which private goods should be used as the instrument for redistribution. The no arbitrage restriction also seems realistic for many goods that are publicly provided in the real world. For example, the typical publicly-provided private goods, public schools (including public colleges) and public health insurance, and public health care, are all commodities that are di¢ cult to resell.
Our analysis also illustrates a more general point related to public …nance. Since Ramsey (1927) , it has been standard in the optimal taxation literature to ask how to best raise a given 1 See Section 5 for a more detailed review of the literature. target revenue without considering what the tax revenue is intended for. Similarly, public good provision and other public expenditure problems always take the size of any outside funds as given. This paper provides an example where the taxation and expenditure problems are non-separable: the optimal commodity tax to …nance the public good should depend on whether the consumer gets access to the public good. 2 Hence, the analytically convenient dichotomy between government expenditures and revenue may result in an e¢ ciency loss.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 characterizes the best separate provision mechanism; Section 4 presents our main results regarding the optimality of public provision of private goods; Section 5 reviews the related literature in greater details and highlights the contributions of this paper; and …nally Section 6 concludes.
The Environment
An economy is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical agents. Agents have preferences over a binary and excludable public good, a binary private good and a perfectly divisible numeraire good that we call "money." The public good can be produced at a per capita cost K > 0; and the binary private good can be produced at unit cost c > 0:
An agent is characterized by her type ( G ; P ) 2 G P = G ; G P ; P where G is her valuation for the public good and P is her valuation for the private good, and these valuations are her private information. To avoid trivialities, we assume that 0 c < P and 0 < K < G : We denote H : G P ! 
where G is the probability of consuming the public good, P is the probability of consuming the private good and m is the transfer of money.
Separate Provision Mechanisms
In this section we analyze a benchmark problem where the planner cannot condition either the price or the access rule for one good on a consumer's reported valuation for the other good. Formally, a separate provision mechanism is an object ( ; G ; t G ; P ; t P ) ; where 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the public good is provided; G : G ! [0; 1] is the probability of access to the public good; t G : G ! R is the fee for consuming the public good; P : P ! [0; 1] is the probability of consuming the private good; and t P : P ! R is the fee for consuming the private good.
The restriction to separate provision mechanisms implies that ( G ; t G ) are functions of G only and cannot depend on P ; and that ( P ; t P ) are functions of P only and cannot depend on G : One interpretation for the separate provision mechanism is that the markets are physically separated in space, and that the government agencies lack the technology to track the behavior of individual agents across markets. Alternatively, the constraint may simply re ‡ect a desire not to intervene in the market for private goods beyond imposing a sales tax.
Note that in our de…nition of the separate provision mechanism, the provision probability is a scalar and that ( G ; t G ; P ; t P ) depend on a single agent's type realization. This simpli…cation is a result of modelling the agents in the economy as a continuum. This simpli…es the analysis tremendously relative to the …nite model, where all decision rules depend on the full type pro…le. However, in a …nite economy with su¢ ciently many agents, the e¤ect of making the provision rule depend on others' announcements becomes negligible due to intuition similar to that of the "Paradox of Voting."As a result, the continuum model can be seen as an approximation of a …nite large economy in our set up (see, e.g., Schmitz 1997 
The Problem
Given a separate provision mechanism ( ; G ; t G ; P ; t P ), the ex ante expected average utility of all the agents in the economy is:
Equation (2) illustrates the simple but important fact that the welfare criterion under the separate provision mechanism is a sum of two terms that separate completely across the two markets. The best separate provision mechanism thus must solve the following problem:
where (3b) represents the incentive compatibility constraints for truth-telling; (3c) represents the participation constraints to ensure that no agent is made strictly worse o¤ than opting out by, e.g., moving to a di¤erent jurisdiction; 5 (3d) is the balanced budget constraint so that the total costs for the production of the public and the private goods do not exceed the total revenue collected from the agents; 6; 7 and …nally, constraint (3e) restricts the probability of accessing the public good to be no more than the probability that the public good is provided.
The Characterization
Note that an important implication of the restriction to separate provision mechanisms is that the incentive compatibility constraints (3b) hold if and only if, for J 2 fG; P g ;
That is, incentive compatibility separates into "public good incentive compatibility" and "private good incentive compatibility." More importantly, it can be shown that the maximization problem (3) can be decomposed into two separate uni-dimensional mechanism design problems. The two separate uni-dimensional problems have the familiar form as in Myerson (1981) and involve a term that has been known as "virtual valuation,"which is de…ned as
5 The imposition of the participation constraint means that our theory is suited to explain the public provision of private goods by local governments. Federal government can typically rely on coercion and does not have to respect individuals'participation constraints. Without the participation constraint, it should be clear that the …rst best can be achieved by simply combining a mechanism a la d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) for the public good with marginal cost pricing for the private good (see, e.g., Mailath and Postlewaite 1990). 6 Note that the total cost depends on the probability of provision , but not on the probability of consumption
This re ‡ects the assumption that the good is non-rival. 7 Also note that (3d) only requires that the resources are balanced in expectation, but this is without loss of generality because one can easily adjust transfers without changing the interim expected payo¤s in such a way as to balance the budget ex post for sure (see, e.g., Borgers and Norman 2008).
Speci…cally, let ( ; G ; t G ; P ; t P ) be a solution to problem (3); the two uni-dimensional problems can be de…ned as follows. The …rst is an excludable public good provision problem taking ( P ; t P ) as given:
And the second is a private good allocation problem taking ( ; G ; t G ) as given:
The following lemma, whose detailed derivation is in the appendix, provides the link between the original planning problem (3) and the two separate uni-dimensional problems (6) and (7):
Lemma 1 If ( ; G ; t G ; P ; t P ) solves the planning problem (3), then ( ; G ) solves (6) and P solves (7); moreover, for J 2 fG; Bg, t
To facilitate further interpretations, observe that the problem for a pro…t maximizing monopolist for the public good would be to maximize
subject only to the constraints (6c) and (6d). For this problem, the "no-haggling" logic of Stokey (1979) , Myerson (1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) immediately implies that the pro…t-maximizing mechanism is, without loss of generality, one where the monopolist charges a single price. However, this result does not extend to our problem where pro…ts appear as a constraint in (6b). In general, the solution to the problem (6), for example, may very well be a randomized mechanism. 8 To rule out randomization in the optimum, we will assume that the "virtual valuation" x J ( J ) as de…ned in (5) is weakly increasing in J ; which is a standard regularity condition. Then (5) is weakly increasing in J for J 2 fG; P g :
is a solution to (6), there exists some f such that
8 As a simple illustration, consider a case where there are two valuation types for the public good, l G and h G : Suppose that charging a ‡at fee equal to l G would violate the budget constraint, whereas charging h G would give a strict budget surplus. It is then obvious that welfare can be made higher by letting the low type agents consume the public good with some probability. The example can easily be extended to continuous densities.
2. If P is a solution to (7), there exists p such that
The proof relies on on the fact that J ( J ) appear linearly in both the objective functions and the constraints. As the argument is quite standard, we here only sketch the proof for Part 1. We take as granted that the problem can be solved by Lagrangian techniques (see Hellwig 2005 for justi…cation). Let 0 be the multiplier on the integral constraint (6b), ( G ) be the multiplier on constraint G ( G ) 0; and ! ( G ) be the multiplier on constraint ( G ) 0: The optimality condition for ( G ) then reads:
together with the appropriate complementary slackness conditions for the non-negativity constraints. As
is continuous and strictly increasing under the regularity condition that x G ( ) is weakly increasing in G , it follows from (11) that the solution has a threshold property, i.e., there exists some
if G G , exactly as described by (9) if we let f = G = : Moreover, Lemma 1 implies that the threshold f in (9) is in fact closely associated transfer t G ( G ):
Thus, the threshold f can be interpreted as an access fee for a lottery where consumers who pay f get access to the public good if it is provided, which happens with probability : 9 The intuition for the proof of Part 2 is almost identical, with the threshold p interpreted as the price for the private good. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that, given the regularity conditions imposed, a solution to (3) may be obtained by solving the following simpli…ed planning problem:
Proposition 1 Suppose that E ( G j G 0) > K and that G < K: Then, in any optimal solution ( ; f ; p ) to (12):
Proof. First, write f and let ; and respectively be the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (13) and the boundary constraints 0 and 1. The Kuhn-Tucker necessary 9 Alternatively, the fee could be charged only when the good is provided, in which case the relevant access price would be f :
conditions for an optimum are:
(Part 1): If p < c; then the …rst term on the right hand side in (17) is strictly positive and the second is weakly positive; thus the condition cannot hold. Suppose that p = c: Then, from (17) either = 0 or 1 H P (c) = 0: Since the second condition is ruled out by the assumption that c < P ; the only possibility that remains is that = 0: But if = 0 at the optimal solution, then constraint (13) is not binding, which implies that ; must solve the following problem:
If > 0 in the solution to the above problem, then the objective function is monotonically decreasing in over max f G ; 0g ; G ; thus it must be that = max f G ; 0g : Thus, if
By assumption E ( G j G 0) > K, so the solution must be = 1; and thus = max f G ; 0g : But, at p = c; = max f G ; 0g and = 1, the right hand side of the budget constraint (13) reads
which is strictly negative, thus the budget constraint (13) is violated, a contradiction. Hence, p > c in any solution to (12) . (Part 2): As Part 1 establishes that p > c in any optimum, it follows that there is a strict budget surplus if = 0 (the tax collected from the private goods due to p > c is unspent). Instead, consider a positive public good provision probability 0 as given by
By construction, constraint (13) is satis…ed by the alternative simple mechanism ( 0 ; = 0; p ) : Clearly ( 0 ; = 0; p ) improves the objective of (12) To summarize, under the standard regularity condition on the virtual valuation x J ( ), the best separate provision mechanism can be characterized by two prices, one for the public and one for the private good, and a provision probability for the public good. In particular, the sole government intervention in the private good market under the best separate provision mechanism can be interpreted as a "unit sales tax" in the amount of p c. Otherwise, the operation of the private good market can be left completely to the private sector. In other words, in the best separate provision mechanism, the private good can be provided in a completely decentralized manner via a competitive market (subject to a sales tax). The only connection between the private and public goods is that the revenue from the unit tax on the private good is used as a cross-subsidy to partially fund the cost of the public good. This is not surprising, as the welfare loss from a small enough tax on the private good is of second order, whereas increasing the probability of public good provision or reducing access fees for the public good leads to a …rst-order welfare gain since we have underprovision of the public good at the constrained optimum. The intuition for the strictly positive public good user fee f is similar: excluding consumers with valuations just above zero leads to only a second order welfare loss, whereas the associated revenue from charging a positive f generates a …rst order welfare gain.
Public Provision of Both Goods
In this section we extend the policy instruments for the government such that it is able to condition the provision probability and price for each of the two goods on the reported valuations of both goods. We interpret this as public provision of both goods since such joint provision mechanisms would not have been implementable if the private good were traded anonymously in the private sector.
For tractability we will study small perturbations of the best separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1. Speci…cally, we will simply add a price ; which is the fee charged to a consumer who consumes the bundle consisting of both the public and the private goods. Hence, we study mechanisms of the form ( ; f; p; ) instead of the mechanisms of the form ( ; f; p) characterized in Proposition 1. Now, f is the user fee for the consumption of the public good only and p is the price for the private good charged to those who do not get access to the public good. If 6 = f + p; it requires that the government be actively involved in provision of the private good because such a scheme is feasible for the government only if it could monitor the consumers' purchases of the private goods. We will show that, generally, charging 6 = f + p improves welfare.
Our local argument is silent on what the optimal joint provision mechanism is. However, we are mainly interested in the qualitative question of whether public provision of a private good can be e¢ ciency enhancing. As we show below that the perturbation outperforms the best separate provision mechanism we identi…ed in Section 3, the constrained optimal joint provision mechanism must be one in which the government takes an active part in the provision of the private good.
One natural question is, does our analysis suggest that all private goods should be publicly provided in an optimal mechanism? The answer is no. A mechanism of the form ( ; f; p; ) with the feature 6 = f + p could be implemented only if consumers cannot engage in arbitrage. Thus, our analysis suggests that only private goods for which consumers cannot engage in price arbitrage could be used by the government to improve e¢ ciency. Indeed, this no-arbitrage restriction seems realistic for many goods that are publicly provided in the real world. For example, publiclyprovided education (including public colleges), public health insurance, and public healthcare are all commodities that are di¢ cult or impossible to resell, thus preventing arbitrage. The necessity to rule out consumer arbitrage strengthens our argument, as it provides an explanation for why some, but not all, private goods are publicly provided.
Demands, Budget Surplus and Social Surplus
As a …rst step, we need to calculate the social surplus as well as the budget surplus under simple pricing mechanisms of the form ( ; f; p; ). To do this we …rst derive the demands for the two goods and the bundle for a given allocation rule ( ; f; p; ) : Given ( ; f; p; ) ; a type-( G ; P ) consumer's demand is easy to characterize: (1) she will demand only the public good if G f 0;
) she will demand only the private good if P p 0; P p G f; and P p G + P ; (3) she will demand the bundle if G + P 0; G + P G f; and G + P P p. In each of the above three cases, which of inequalities are relevant depends on whether the bundle is cheaper or more expensive than the components. The two sub…gures in Figure 1 plot the consumer's demand for the private good and public goods as a function of her valuations ( G ; P ) for the case f + p and the case > f + p respectively. Notice that we have scaled down the valuation for the public good by the provision probability in the graphs. Calculation based on Figure 1 immediately yields that the relevant demands can be summarized as in Table 1 .
For notational simplicity, let z = ( ; f; p; ) : De…ne by G 1 (z) the budget surplus (if positive) or budget de…cit (if negative) given prices z = ( ; f; p; ) for the case f + p: Using the demands delineated in Table 1 , we can write this as:
Symmetrically, we let G 2 (z) denote the budget surplus/de…cit given prices z = ( ; f; p; ) for the case f + p :
Note that G 1 (z) = G 2 (z) when = f + p which can be seen by substituting = f + p into (20) and (21) . Next, let S 1 (z) denote the social surplus given prices z = ( ; f; p; ) for the case f + p,
Symmetrically, let S 2 (z) be the social surplus given prices z = ( ; f; p; ) for the case f + p:
For the same reasons as that for the budget surplus, S 1 (z) = S 2 (z) when = f + p:
Two Auxiliary Problems
In order to provide conditions for when public provision of the private good outperforms the best decentralized outcome, we construct two auxiliary optimization problems. In words, the problems de…ne the optimal price vectors ( ; f; p; ) under the restrictions that f + p and f + p respectively. Speci…cally, let ( ; f ; p ) be the best separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1; the two auxiliary problems are as follows. The …rst problem is:
s.t.
Problem (24) de…nes the best simple pricing policy in the form of ( ; f; p; ) under the restriction that = and f + p. That is, the public good provision probability is …xed at the level as in the best separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1, and the bundle is restricted to be no more expensive than separate purchase of its components. It is important to note that (f ; p ; f + p ) is a feasible solution for (24) . Similarly, the second auxiliary problem is:
Problem (25) gives the best simple pricing policy in the form of ( ; f; p; ) under the restriction that = and f + p. That is, the public good provision probability is …xed at the level as in the best separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1, and the bundle is restricted to be no cheaper than separate purchase of its components. Again, (f ; p ; f + p ) is a feasible also for (25) .
The reason for constructing these auxiliary optimization problems is that a necessary condition for the best separate provision mechanism to be optimal when joint provision is feasible is that (f ; p ; f + p ) solves both (24) and (25) . Our main result is a su¢ cient condition under which (f ; p ; f + p ) cannot solve both problems (24) and (25) . Hence, under the identi…ed su¢ cient condition there must exist a perturbation that improves welfare relative to that achieved by the best separate provision mechanism. Consequently, the constrained optimal joint provision mechanism must also feature public provision of the private good.
Di¤erentiating (20) and evaluating at z = ( ; f ; p ; f + p ) ; we …nd that: 10
These expressions inform us about the e¤ect on the budget when one slightly perturbs the relevant prices f; p and from z = ( ; f ; p ; f + p ) : Likewise, if we di¤erentiate S 1 ( ) in (22) and evaluate at z = z ; we obtain:
We can also write out explicitly the gradients for S 2 and G 2 , which we omit here. Our …rst preliminary result is that, evaluated at z = ( ; f ; p ; f + p ), the partial derivatives of G 1 and G 2 are the same, and the partial derivatives of S 1 and S 2 also coincide. Letting DG i (z) and DS i (z) denote the gradient vectors for i = 1; 2; we thus have that:
Lemma 3 follows from straightforward but tedious algebra. It is analogous to the well-known "smooth pasting"condition in optimal control problem with switching points (see, e.g. Dixit 1993 ). Here, the relevant budget surplus function switch from G 1 to G 2 at z ; and we have the analog of "value matching" of G 1 and G 2 at z ; i.e., G 1 (z ) = G 2 (z ) : Lemma 3 simply states that the two functions are smoothly pasted at the switch point z : The same is true for the social surplus functions S 1 and S 2 at the switch point z :
Now we establish a useful lemma:
Lemma 4 Let be the multiplier on constraint (13) corresponding to the solution ( ; f ; p ) of problem (12) . Also, let i be the multiplier on the resource constraint G i (f; p; ; ) for i = 1; 2 in problem (24) and (25) . Then,
Proof. First consider (24) . If z solves the problem, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a solution must be ful…lled at z : Hence, there must exist 1 > 0 and 1 0 such that
Using the expressions for the partial derivatives in (26) and (27), it is easy to check that:
Combining (28a) and (28c), and using (29), we have that
This condition is the same as (16), one of the …rst order conditions to problem (12) when the goods are sold separately. It follows that 1 = ; since otherwise (30) will be violated. This proves the …rst part.
For the second part, we note that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for Problem (25) are
where the …rst equality in each line follows from Lemma 3. The same argument applies. Together, Lemmas 3 and 4 make the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (24) comparable with those for problem (25).
The Main Result
Now our main result about the su¢ cient condition under which public provision of private goods will improve welfare over the best separate provision mechanism follows: Proposition 2 Let be the multiplier on constraint (13) corresponding to the solution ( ; f ; p ) of problem (12) . Then, there exists a feasible simple pricing policy of the form (f; p; ) that generates a higher social surplus than the best separate provision mechanism whenever
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, (f ; p ; f + p ) solves both problems (24) and (25) . Lemma 4 then implies that the multiplier in each problem must be given by : Thus if z is the best simple pricing policy for problem (24) , then
Similarly if z is the best simple pricing policy for problem (25) , then by using Lemma 3, we have
Assume that 1 > 0: Then, (32) implies that
< 0; which makes it impossible to …nd 2 0 such that (33) holds. Symmetrically, if 2 > 0; then
> 0; which makes it impossible to …nd 1 0 such that (32) holds. Since z must solve both (24) and (25) for there to be no improvement we conclude that 1 = 2 = 0; or else there is some z better than z : The claim follows.
Because the simple pricing joint provision mechanism is a subset of all feasible joint provision mechanisms, an immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that whenever condition (31) is satis…ed, the optimal joint provision mechanism must generate higher social welfare than the optimal separate provision mechanism.
Independence
Now we use Proposition 2 above to examine the case where G and P are independent. In this case, there is indeed always an improvement over the best separate provision policy.
Proposition 3 Suppose that G and P are independent. Then
5 Related Literature
Literature on the Public Provision of Private Goods. It is useful to divide the existing literature on public provision of private goods into three strands. The …rst strand, as represented by Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) and Epple and Romano (1996) , is a positive theory driven by political economy considerations. Epple and Romano (1996) consider a model where the level of a private good (say, "health care") and whether private purchases are permitted to supplement the public provision are determined by majority voting. They show that, under standard assumptions on voter preferences, a regime with positive government provision and no restriction on private supplement is majority preferred to one of either only market provision or only government provision. The key intuition is that the median voter, who has income below the population mean, receives a positive net transfer if private goods are publicly provided. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) use a similar model (with the crucial di¤erence that the private good is only partially subsidized) to explain how public provision of private goods may occur even if the incidence favors wealthier households.
The second strand shows that public provision of private goods may serve as a tool for income redistribution from the rich to the poor, but it assumes, instead of explains, why in-kind transfers are preferred to cash transfers. For example, Besley and Coate (1991) considers a model where households may opt out from public provision and purchase a higher quality version of the good if they are dissatis…ed with the quality of the publicly-provided good. If the willingness to pay for quality is increasing in wealth, mainly rich households opt out from the publicly provided private goods, implying that the system of public provision of private goods can serve as a transfer towards poor individuals. 12 The third strand, to which our paper is most closely related, takes a normative perspective and identi…es circumstances under which providing a private good in-kind is a more e¢ cient transfer instrument than cash transfers. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) studied a setup where consumers have private information about their preferences and showed that in-kind transfers can be desirable due to its screening role, which allows better targeted transfers. 13 Coate (1995) analyzed an environment where the rich has altruistic preferences towards the poor and would like to insure the poor's income risks. If the poor are given cash, they may still opt not to purchase insurance to exploit the Samaritan's Dilemma. As a result, the rich may prefer to give the poor an in-kind transfer of insurance to overcome the di¢ culty of committing not to provide ex post assistance. 14 Garratt and Marshall (1994) considered the case of the public …nancing of college education. They argue that public …nance of college education (a private good) provides gambles that families desire.
Our paper complements the above literature by analyzing a full mechanism design problem faced by a social planner with no desire to redistribute across individuals. Notably, we do not impose any exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible policy instruments other than the natural participation and incentive compatibility constraints by the individuals for our comparison benchmark of what can be achieved by the market without public provision of private goods. In contrast, Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) , Epple and Romano (1996) , Besley and Coate (1991) , Garratt and Marshall (1994) , and many others do rely on exogenously imposed restrictions on the available policy instruments. However, the participation constraints imposed in our analysis of the best separate provision mechanism does imply that our theory is suited mostly as a theory for the public provision of private goods by local governments (see footnote 5).
The key role played by the public provision of private goods in our paper also di¤ers substantially from targeted transfers, commitment problems, or demand for gambles. In our paper, public provision of private goods supplies the government with information about individuals' private good purchases that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction that be used to fund the typically under-provided public goods.
Also importantly, our paper not only explains that public provision of some private goods may 1 2 Other arguments based on a desire to redistribute income can be found in Christiansen (1995, 1999 ) and Cremer and Gahvarib (1997 (1989) , going from (26b) to their main result is relatively straightforward since they demonstrated that pro…ts may be increased relative to separate pricing, by adding the bundle. Since they study pro…t maximization their analogue of (f ; p ) are chosen to solve a monopolist pro…t maximization problem under separate pricing. Thus their p ; for example, must satisfy the …rst order optimality condition [1 H P (p )] (p c) h P (p ) = 0: If G and P are independent, the …rst term in (26b) becomes:
which is equal to zero from the optimality condition of p in their problem. Thus it follows immediately from (26b) that a small increase in the price of the private good (or a small decrease in the price from the bundle) would increase the pro…ts in the case of independence. It can also be veri…ed that a small increase in the price of the public good also increases pro…ts if G and P are stochastically independent. Our problem di¤ers from McAfee et al. (1989) in two respects. First of all, our goal is to demonstrate that bundling can increase social welfare rather than pro…ts. Secondly, because (f ; p ) in our problem, as characterized in Proposition 1, are not chosen to maximize pro…ts, we cannot use the …rst order conditions from the optimal separable provision mechanism in the same way as McAfee et al. (1989) .
One may also be tempted to explain the public provision of private goods as simply a way for the government to maximize revenue collections. In order for such an interpretation to be valid, however, one has to explicitly model how the government will be using the collected revenues. Our theory is relevants along as governments are aiming to maximize some measure of social welfare, not just revenues alone.
Conclusion
This paper shows that public provision of private goods by a local government may be justi…ed on pure e¢ ciency grounds, even if the local government does not seek to redistribute resources. We believe that this is important for two reasons. Firstly, while the literature has identi…ed situations where in-kind redistribution leads to improvements in how well targeted the transfers are, cash transfers are still superior to in-kind redistribution in many cases since the latter misallocates resources. Secondly, there are large scale programs that publicly provide private goods for which the redistributional e¤ects are neutral or regressive. For these reasons we believe that a theory that does not rely upon a desire to redistribute is needed.
The theory developed in this paper is based on asymmetric information and the premise that governments also provide non-rival goods. In such an environment we show that public provision of a private good generates information that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction, which helps overcome ine¢ ciencies in public good provision. Our main result establishes that public provision of the private good improves economic e¢ ciency under a condition that is always ful…lled under independence and satis…ed for a large set of joint distributions.
The explanation of publicly provided private goods advanced in this paper di¤ers substantially from explanations emphasized in the existing literature, which typically rely on preferences for redistribution. Unlike most of the literature, we are also able to avoid ad hoc restrictions on the set of policy instruments, such as ruling out cash transfers. In contrast, we take a purist mechanism design perspective, so that the benchmark outcome without public provision of the private good is constrained optimal subject to incentive feasibility.
One of the most important assumptions in our model is that consumers cannot arbitrage the goods. If goods can be bartered between consumers, public provision is a useless tool for the government. We think this is a strength of our model as because in-state college tuition, public health insurance, and public schools are all commodities that are costly and/or di¢ cult to resell. Thus our paper also provides an explanation of why some, but not all, private goods are publicly provided.
Finally, our analysis also exempli…es a more general point about the optimal taxation literature. Our model combines optimal commodity taxation with a decision on how to provide an excludable public good. We found that the marginal price for access to the public good for consumers that purchase the private good should be di¤erent from those who do not. Hence, our model is a stylized example where provision and user fees for the public good, and taxes on the private good must be jointly determined in order to achieve economic e¢ ciency. Our paper thus illustrates that the standard practice of separating the question of how a given budget should be spent from the question of how a given tax revenue should be raised generates e¢ ciency losses.
A Details About Lemma 1.
Let ( ; G ; t G ; P ; t P ) solve the planning problem (3). Because, as argued in (4), the incentive compability constraints (3b) can be separated for the private good and the public good, we know that, …x ( P ; t P ), ( ; G ; t G ) must solve:
The optimization problem (A1) takes the private good allocation rule ( P ; t P ) from an optimal mechanism as given and solves for an optimal allocation of the public good conditional on the transfer between markets (the constant in A3) and the reservation utilities implied by ( P ; t P ) : Symmetrically, …x ( ; G ; t G ) ; ( P ; t P ) must solve:
s.t. 0 P ( P ) P t P ( P ) P ( b P ) P + t P ( b P ) 8 P ; b P 2 P (A5)
That is, taking the public good provision as given, ( P ; t P ) solves for the least distorted allocation of private goods conditional on the transfer to the other market and reservation utilities implied. De…ne the "indirect utility functions"
